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Abstract. We propose a new notion of cryptographic tamper evidence. A tamper-evident signature
scheme provides an additional procedure Div which detects tampering: given two signatures, Div can
determine whether one of them was generated by the forger. Surprisingly, this is possible even after the
adversary has inconspicuously learned (exposed
1
) some | or even all | the secrets in the system. In
this case, it might be impossible to tell which signature is generated by the legitimate signer and which
by the forger. But at least the fact of the tampering will be made evident.
We dene several variants of tamper-evidence, diering in their power to detect tampering. In all of
these, we assume an equally powerful adversary: she adaptively controls all the inputs to the legitimate
signer (i.e., all messages to be signed and their timing), and observes all his outputs; she can also
adaptively expose all the secrets at arbitrary times.
We provide tamper-evident schemes for all the variants and prove their optimality.
Achieving the strongest tamper evidence turns out to be provably expensive. However, we dene a
somewhat weaker, but still practical, variant: -synchronous tamper-evidence (-te) and provide -te
schemes with logarithmic cost. Our -te schemes use a combinatorial construction of -separating sets,
which might be of independent interest.
We stress that our mechanisms are purely cryptographic: the tamper-detection algorithm Div is stateless
and takes no inputs except the two signatures (in particular, it keeps no logs), we use no infrastructure
(or other ways to conceal additional secrets), and we use no hardware properties (except those implied
by the standard cryptographic assumptions, such as random number generators).
Our constructions are based on arbitrary ordinary signature schemes and do not require random oracles.
1 Introduction
Key exposure is a well-known threat for any cryptographic tool. For signatures, exposed keys are
revoked after the exposure is detected. This detection of the exposure has previously been dealt
with outside the scope of cryptography (e.g., delegated to hardware and/or heuristic \forensics").
Indeed, if an adversary inconspicuously learned all the secret information within the system, it may
seem that the cryptographic tools without any remaining secrets are helpless against her.
This paper challenges this perception, by providing a cryptographic mechanism to detect the
adversary's presence within the system even after she has learned all the secrets. Thus, while it still
might not be possible to distinguish forger-generated signatures from the legitimate ones, our new
mechanisms can at least make the tampering evident.
1.1 Related work
Key exposures: avoidance and damage containment. Some mechanisms to minimize the
damage from break-ins have been proposed in the past. A representative sample of these methods
1
We say that a secret is exposed when it becomes known to the adversary. Exposure does not imply that the secrets
become publicly known. Moreover, nobody | except the adversary | is aware of the exposure taking place.
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and references include threshold [DF89,Ped91,BF97], pro-active [OY91,HJJ
+
97,CHH00], remotely-
keyed [Bla95,Bla96,Luc97,BFN98], key-insulated [DKXY02,DKXY], intrusion-resilient [IR02,Itk02],
all-or-nothing protection [CDH
+
00], etc. In these methods, secrets are typically protected by being
distributed (shared among multiple modules), thus minimizing the eect of partial exposures.
In this paper, however, we focus on the total and inconspicuous exposures of all the secrets
within the system at the time of the exposure. For such exposures, only forward-security has
being dened [And97,BM99] and achieved [And97,BM99,Kra00,AR00,IR01,MMM02,Itk02,KR02]
previously. None of these approaches provided any help in detecting whether an exposure occurred.
Fail-stop signatures. Tamper-evident signatures should be distinguished from the fail-stop
signatures [PP97]: the fail-stop signatures do not address the issue of dealing with an adversary
who learned the signer's secrets.
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Instead, they help only in the case of a computationally powerful
adversary. Namely, in the fail-stop model, each public key has a large number of valid private key
values corresponding to it. An adversary may be powerful enough to compute all of these private
keys, but still cannot determine which of these keys is known to the signer. Given a signature forged
by such an adversary, the signer, however, can repudiate it by proving that he does not know the
specic private key that must have been used to forge the signature. Thus, that approach too does
not oer any help in the case when the signer's keys have been exposed.
Coercive exposures. Some previous work addresses the issue of dealing with the situations where
the secret keys are exposed under some coercive methods. In such cases, the coerced signer may use
some kind of subliminal communication embedded in the signature to inform the authorities that
the signature and/or secret keys were extracted from the signer under duress (see, e.g., [HJJY00]).
Another approach proposes monotone signature schemes [NPT01], which allow the verication
algorithm to be updated after an attack. Namely, under duress the signer can reveal some (but
not all!) of his secrets to the adversary. These secrets enable the adversary to generate signatures
that are valid according to the current verication algorithm. However, this verication algorithm
can then be updated so that all the signatures generated by the legitimate signer (before or after
the update) remain valid, but all the signatures generated by the adversary are not valid under
the updated verication. Again, this approach does not work in case of total exposures. Also, the
cost of these signatures is linear in the number of updates. This matches our least eÆcient (but
strongest) construction, except that we do not require the updates of the verication algorithm. In
fact, our general lower-bounds proof in Sec. 4 can be modied to yield the linear lower bounds for
the length of the monotone signatures
3
, thus proving optimality of the results of [NPT01]. To the
best of our knowledge no lower bounds for monotone signatures were shown previously. However,
slightly modifying the denition of the monotone signatures | to allow key evolution | allows
exponential performance improvement (see Sec. 5).
1.2 Our contribution: Tamper Evidence
In contrast to the previous work, we consider the situation where the adversary inconspicuously
learns all secrets of the system at some (unknown) points of time. Our goal is to provide security
after such undetected total exposures.
2
In fact, in [PP97], the authors write \Naturally, this possibility of distinguishing forged signatures from authentic
signatures only exists as long as forger has not stolen the signer's key". We show that this observation does not
fully apply to the key-evolving signatures (which were introduced after the above paper).
3
Indeed, some of our constructions (namely, the strongly tamper-evident schemes) bear similarity to some of those of
[NPT01]. It may be interesting to explore whether/how some of the optimizations proposed there for the monotone
signatures might be applied to improve performance of our schemes (up to constant factors).
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Intuition. Suppose the adversary learns all the secrets at time t
e
. Then, clearly, she has all the
keys of the legitimate signer, and thus can generate valid signatures. However, if both the signer and
the adversary remain active (i.e., generate signatures) then the system has changed fundamentally:
instead of having a single entity | the legitimate signer | it now contains two active \versions"
running at the same time. Now, if the signer evolves in some randomized fashion, then the two
versions will diverge (see Fig. 1), and this divergence might be detectable.
State
S
Time
F
t1 2et t
Fig. 1. Divergence of forger and signer. Signer's secrets are exposed at time t
e
. It still may be possible to tell whether
signatures, generated at t
1
; t
2
> t
e
, originated from the dierent \branches" (one signer's, the other { forger's).
Approach. Indeed, this is exactly what we capture in our denitions. We use key-evolving schemes
(dened originally for forward-security [BM99]) as the basis for our denitions. Any direct connec-
tion between tamper-evident and forward-secure signatures stops at that. In particular, it is crucial
for the tamper-evident schemes to use true randomness for the evolution. Even pseudo-randomness
is not suÆcient, as the seed might be exposed too. But for forward-secure signatures, randomness
| even if used, as in [BM99] | can be replaced with pseudo-randomness (as done in [Kra00] to
achieve some optimizations). Using true randomness in key evolution allows us to achieve and then
detect divergence of the signer's and forger's versions. Detection of this divergence is exactly what
constitutes tamper-evidence | thus the name Div for the new procedure.
Variants, constructions, lower bounds. We dene several variants of tamper-evidence. In
all the variants we allow the forger F to adaptively determine all the messages to be signed by the
legitimate signer S, and the times when they are to be signed, before and/or after the exposure
and/or the forgery.
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The strongest variant guarantees to detect divergence given any two signatures generated by S
and F at any two time periods after the exposure (it is impossible to do anything beyond forward-
security for the periods before the exposure
4
). We present a tamper-evident signature scheme with
this strong tamper-evidence property. This scheme imposes linear in time performance penalty.
Moreover, we prove that no better scheme is possible.
Fortunately, more eÆcient schemes are possible for slightly weaker notions of tamper-evidence:
Perfectly-synchronous tamper-evidence works with the same powerful adversary, but guarantees
to detect divergence only when the two given signatures are generated by the signer S and the forger
F at the same time period after the key exposure.
-synchronous tamper-evidence generalizes the above notions: for such schemes, the tampering
is guaranteed to be detected as long as the time periods of the two signatures are relatively closer
to each other than to the exposure time. The exact relative proximity is characterized by the
parameter  ( = 0 yielding strong and  =1 | perfectly-synchronous tamper-evidence).
We present both perfectly- and - synchronous tamper-evident schemes. The cost of the rst
one is only twice that of an ordinary signature scheme. For any nite constant  > 0, we construct
an -synchronous tamper-evident scheme with a logarithmic factor overhead (with  appearing in
the base of the logarithm). We prove asymptotic optimality of all these schemes.
Next, in Section 2 we formally dene tamper-evident signature schemes and present our con-
structions in Section 3. In Section 4 we prove the optimality of our constructions by proving the
information-theoretic lower-bounds. Finally, in the Section 5 we discuss various aspects of the
tamper-evident signatures, including their potential applications. We also propose there some im-
provements for the monotone signatures.
2 Denitions
2.1 Functional denitions
Key Evolving Signature Schemes. As discussed above, tamper-evident signatures must evolve
the signer's state, similarly to the forward-secure signatures, but for a dierent reason.
5
We therefore
use the denition of the key-evolving signature schemes proposed by Bellare and Miner [BM99].
Intuitively, in key-evolving schemes the public key remains unchanged, while the corresponding
secret key changes periodically. This denition is purely functional: security is addressed separately.
Key-evolving signature scheme is a quadruple of algorithms KESig=(Gen;Upd;Sign;Vf), where:
KESig:Gen, the probabilistic key generation algorithm.
Input: a security parameter k 2 N (given in unary as 1
k
); and the total number of periods T ;
Output: a pair (SK
0
;PK ), the initial secret key and the public key;
KESig:Upd, the probabilistic secret key update algorithm.
Input: the secret key SK
t
for the current period t < T ;
Output: the new secret key SK
t+1
for the next period t+ 1.
KESig:Sign, the (possibly probabilistic) signing algorithm.
Input: the secret key SK
t
= hS
t
; t; T i for the time period t  T and the messageM to be signed;
Output: the signature ht; sigi of M for time period t.
4
We can limit the window of vulnerability to the period of the exposure by combining tamper-evidence with forward-
security. This window of vulnerability is even stronger if tamper-evidence is combined with intrusion-resilience.
5
In particular, randomness of the evolution was optional for forward-security, but is crucial for tamper-evidence;
while one-wayness of the evolution was of central value for forward-security, but is optional for tamper-evidence.
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KESig:Vf, the verication algorithm.
Input: the public key PK ; a message M ; and an alleged signature ht; sigi;
Output: valid if ht; sigi is a valid signature of M , or fail otherwise.
We require that KESig:Vf
PK
(M;KESig:Sign
SK
t
(M)) = valid for all M and t. For some schemes, T
is optional: i.e., T =1 [Itk02].
Divergence test. As discussed in the introduction, at the core of our tamper-evidence is the
observation that after the key exposure there in essence exist two versions of the signer within the
system | while under normal conditions (without compromises) there should be only one. Thus we
say that the exposure leads to divergence. To accommodate functionally the test of this condition
| which provides tamper-evidence | we add one more procedure to the above:
KESig:Div, the (possibly probabilistic) divergence test algorithm.
Input: two signatures ht
1
; 
1
i; ht
2
; 
2
i;
Output: foul if divergence is detected; ok otherwise.
2.2 Security denitions
Signature security. For the sake of brevity, we skip the signature security denition | it
is essentially the same as the classic denition of Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest's [GMR88] for
(ordinary) digital signatures secure against adaptive chosen message attacks (but as in the other
key-evolving schemes | such as forward-secure signatures | the authenticity includes the period
number: we consider the adversary successful even if she generates a signature diering only in the
period number from one of those generated by the legitimate signer).
Tamper-evidence. Say that KESig is self-consistent if KESig:Div(ht
1
; 
1
i; ht
2
; 
2
i) = ok for all
signature pairs ht
1
; 
1
i, ht
2
; 
2
i, provided that both signatures are generated by the same legitimate
signer S (legitimate signer does not deviate from the algorithms specied by the scheme). We
consider only self-consistent schemes in this paper.
Denition 1 (Adversary). Let F be an adversary and S the legitimate signer (for the given
instance of KESig, generated independently of F ). Allow F to adaptively obtain from S both signa-
tures for any time-period/message pairs (t;M), and secret keys SK
i
. Let t
e
be the latest exposure
time period: maximum t such that F obtained SK
t
. Eventually (after polynomially-bounded time),
F must output two signatures fht
1
; 
1
i; ht
2
; 
2
ig, such that t
1
; t
2
> t
e
, and ht
1
; 
1
i was gener-
ated by S (upon F 's request), while ht
2
; 
2
i by F (i.e., the corresponding ht
2
;Mi was not queried
from S). We write F
S
! ht
e
; f(t
1
; 
1
); (t
2
; 
2
)gi. The probability that the adversary succeeds is
PrSucc
KESig
(F )
def
= Prob[KESig:Div(ht
1
; 
1
i; ht
2
; 
2
i)=okand KESig:Vf(ht
i
; 
i
i)=valid; i=1; 2].
Denition 2 (Tamper-Evidence Safety).
Let KESig be self-consistent, and let k be a security parameter. Let F
S
! ht
e
; f(t
1
; 
1
); (t
2
; 
2
)gi.
ft
0
1
; t
0
2
g are t
0
e
-safe (for KESig) if PrSucc
KESig
(F ) < 1=2
k
whenever t
e
= t
0
e
and ft
1
; t
2
g=ft
0
1
; t
0
2
g.
In other words, let S be the set of all triplets ht
0
e
; ft
0
1
; t
0
2
gi such that if for any F as above
F
S
!ht
e
; f(t
1
; 
1
); (t
2
; 
2
)gi and ht
e
; ft
1
; t
2
gi2S then PrSucc
KESig
(F ) < 1=2
k
. ft
0
1
; t
0
2
g are t
0
e
-safe
i ht
0
e
; ft
0
1
; t
0
2
gi 2 S:
Denition 3 (Strong Tamper-Evidence). KESig is strongly tamper-evident if t
0
1
and t
0
2
are
t
0
e
-safe for all t
0
1
; t
0
2
> t
0
e
.
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Below we consider two weaker versions of tamper-evidence. For both of them, we preserve the
power of the adversary. Unlike the strong tamper-evident schemes, both of these weaker versions
are allowed to miss some cases of tampering. The rst | weaker | guarantees to detect tampering
only for simultaneous signatures:
Denition 4 (Perfectly Synchronous Tamper-Evidence). KESig is perfectly-synchronous
tamper-evident if ft
0
1
; t
0
2
g are t
0
e
-safe for any t
0
1
; t
0
2
; t
0
e
, such that t
0
1
= t
0
2
> t
0
e
.
This notion of synchronicity can be relaxed signicantly: namely, we can tolerate any distance
between the time periods t
1
; t
2
of the signatures, as long as they are closer to each other than some
factor (1=) of their distance to the exposure time t
e
:
Denition 5 (-Synchronous Tamper-Evidence). KESig is -synchronous tamper-evident if
ft
0
1
; t
0
2
g are t
0
e
-safe for any t
0
1
; t
0
2
; t
0
e
such that min(t
0
1
; t
0
2
)  t
e
> jt
0
1
  t
0
2
j.
Note: 0-synchronous tamper-evidence is equivalent to the strong one of denition 3, while perfectly
synchronous tamper-evidence of denition 4 corresponds to 1-synchronous tamper-evidence. We
abbreviate -synchronous tamper-evident as -te (e.g., KESig in denitions 5, 4, and 3 are -te,
1-te, and 0-te, respectively).
Possible relaxations. One might wish to further relax the above denitions, e.g., to achieve
more eÆcient constructions. Such relaxations may include limiting adversary powers and/or allow-
ing not self-consistent schemes (i.e., \self-consistent" only with high probability), and/or allowing
the probability of missing divergence to be much greater (e.g., less than some constant, say 1%),
etc. In this paper we do not consider any such relaxations.
3 Constructions
This section proposes constructions for the strongly and synchronous tamper-evident schemes. The
subsequent Section 4 shows that these constructions are optimal (at least up to a constant factor),
by proving the matching lower bounds.
Our constructions are generic in the sense that they can be based on any ordinary signature
scheme. Also they easily generalize to allow addition of tamper-evidence to other signature models,
such as forward-secure or intrusion-resilient.
3.1 Strongly Tamper-Evident Scheme
Construction: Intuitively, this construction extends an ordinary signature by simply appending
to it a sequence of hsignature - public keyi pairs, where each signature is to be veried using
the corresponding public key of the pair. The public keys (and corresponding secret keys) are
generated at random, one per time period. So, a tamper-evident signature at time t includes t of
these randomly generated (and uncertied) public keys. When the signer's secrets are exposed at
time t
e
, the adversary learns all the t
e
secret keys corresponding to these t
e
randomly generated
public keys. But after t
e
, the signer generates new public-secret key pairs, such that the secret keys
for these are not known to the adversary. So, the adversary must either use dierent public keys
for t > t
e
| which enables detection of divergence, or must forge the signatures for the signer's
public keys for periods t > t
e
, without knowing the corresponding secret keys.
Formally, let  be any ordinary signature scheme. S
i
denotes a specic instance of  with the
corresponding private and public keys S
i
:SK ;S
i
:PK generated by the  :Gen algorithm.
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Dene KESig:Gen to be  :Gen! (KESig:SK
0
= S
0
:SK ;KESig:PK = S
0
:PK ).
KESig:Upd(SK
t 1
), for t  T , runs  :Gen! S
t
:hPK ;SK i. These keys are appended to the current
key KESig:SK
t 1
yielding the next period's key KESig:SK
t
= ht;S
0
:SK ; hS
i
:PK ;S
i
:SK i
i=1 to t
i.
KESig:Sign(SK
t
; t;M), for t  T , runs S
i
:Sign(SK ; ht;Mi) ! 
i
for all i = 0 to t, generating the
signature
b

t;M
= ht; 
0
; hS
i
:PK ; 
i
i
i=1 to t
i.
KESig:Vf(PK ;M; ht; 
0
; : : :i), returns valid if S
i
:Vf(PK ; ht;Mi) for all i : 0  i  t (i.e., all the
ordinary signatures are veried).
6
Finally, to test for foul play, KESig:Div(
b

t
1
;M
1
;
b

0
t
2
;M
2
) rst veries all the S-signatures (except
the very rst; their numbers must match the corresponding time periods) in both
b

t
1
;M
1
and
b

0
t
2
;M
2
for ht
1
;M
1
i and ht
2
;M
2
i respectively, and if any are invalid, it returns foul.
7
If all the S-
signatures are valid, it returns ok if one of the sequences hS
i
:PK i
i=1 to t
1
and hS
0
j
:PK i
j=1 to t
2
from
b

t
1
;M
2
;
b

t
2
;M
2
respectively, is a prex of the other. Otherwise, KESig:Div returns foul.
Claim. KESig is as secure as  (in the sense of [GMR88]).
Assuming that  is secure, KESig is strongly tamper-evident (0-te).
Proof sketch: The proof of signature security is trivial, because our signature simply contains the
ordinary signature, appended with random values, which can be easily simulated.
It is also obvious that our scheme is self-consistent.
For the tamper-evidence proof, reduce forging a signature S to F fooling the Div test. Suppose
that we are given a public key S:PK (and no corresponding secret key). Suppose that we are also
given a signature oracle access to the S-signer. The goal is to use forger F | violating the tamper-
evidence of our scheme | to generate an non-queried signature valid for S:PK . To achieve this,
guess a time period j(= t
2
) for which F will fool the Div test, and set S
j
:PK  S:PK . All the
other parameters and keys are generated by the simulator at random. Then the (adaptive) queries
of F can be satised by the simulator either directly or with the help of the S-signer oracle.
If F chooses t
e
< j and t
1
; t
2
 j, and succeeds in generating ht
2
; 
2
i which passes that KESig:Div
test, then 
2
contains the S-signature for ht
2
;Mi for someM . If F succeeds, then ht
2
;Mi was never
queried, and thus is a forgery for the S. ut
Note: inclusion of t in ht;Mi is needed to prevent the truncation attack. Namely, F obtains
from the signature oracle for S the signature 
1
= 
ht
1
;Mi
for the message M at time t
1
. Then, if t
is not included in all the messages for any t
2
< t
1
, 
2
= 
ht
2
;Mi
is a prex of 
1
, and thus can be
obtained from it by a simple truncation.
3.2 Perfectly Synchronous Tamper-Evident Scheme
Simple construction: Suppose we use the above scheme, but we are guaranteed that t
1
= t
2
= t.
Then we can actually drop all the keys and signatures hS
i
:PK ; 
i
i
i=1 to t 1
, leaving only the \real"
signature S
0
and the last period's appended signature hS
t
:PK ; 
t
i.
The proof above is essentially unaected by this omission.
The benet to the eÆciency is, of course, dramatic: now a tamper-evident signature is just twice
as long as the ordinary one.
6
It is feasible to have the verication of the uncertied keys as part of Div, but it would require changing the
functional denition to pass the message to Div. Also, instead of signing the message with all the keys, it is
possible to form a certication chain. This variant can be more eÆcient in some aspects: the chain does not
need to regenerated for each signature. Moreover, the chained construction must be used to achieve the universal
indisputability of the tamper evidence discussed in Section 5. However, the version in the main text appears slightly
simpler to discuss. In particular, the security proof of the chained version requires random oracles.
7
This may not be needed, if these signatures have been veried by KESig:Vf, as suggested in the above footnote.
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Tree-based construction. A similar synchronous tamper-evident scheme can be obtained using
tree-based constructions for forward-secure and intrusion-resilient schemes [BM99,MMM02,Itk02].
Indeed these constructions served as one of the inspirations for this work. While not as eÆcient
as the previous synchronous tamper-evident scheme, the tree-based construction below provides a
somewhat more exible synchronicity restriction than the above scheme as well as some intuition
for our subsequent constructions for the -synchronous schemes.
Intuitively all of these tree-based schemes construct a \certication hierarchy" tree using S-
signatures. In this tree, each leaf corresponds to a time period and each node has a public-secret
key-pair corresponding to it. The root public key is the public key of the tree-based scheme. And
each signature is generated using the corresponding leaf keys and includes the certication path
from the leaf public key to the root. Thus each tree-based scheme signature includes a logarithmic
number of ordinary signatures (all, but one, are computed at most once per period, independently
of the message being signed).
The hierarchy is actually not constructed all at once, but rather generated as needed.
8
Our main observation here is that, as for the strong tamper-evidence, the S-key-pairs can be
generated in a randomized fashion (i.e., without pseudo-randomness, as in, say, [Kra00]). This way,
even though a similar (actually even slightly larger) number of keys is generated by S in t time
periods, each signature must include only O(lg t) of these keys, and a signature for each of these
O(lg t) keys. Moreover, all but one (leaf) signatures are computed only once per period (or even
less frequently) and are simply re-used for each signature.
t t te 21 t’2
Fig. 2. Tree-based scheme. Here, it is easy to see that the common prex of the paths from root to t
1
and t
2
is not
a prex of the path from the root to t
e
. On the other hand, t
1
and t
0
2
do not have this property. Thus, Div test can
detect divergence for times t
1
; t
2
but not t
1
; t
0
2
.
8
The original tree-based schemes [BM99,MMM02,Itk02] stored the secret keys of the \right path" for the current
leaf (see [Itk02]). For the scheme here, since we are not concerned with forward-security, we can simplify to store
the secrets corresponding to the nodes on the path from the current leaf to the root (instead of its right path).
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Intuitively, this scheme has somewhat looser synchronicity restrictions than the perfectly syn-
chronous tamper-evidence: it can detect divergence as long as the paths from root to t
1
and t
2
diverge after they diverge with t
e
(or in other words, the common prex of t
1
and t
2
is not a prex
of t
e
, see Fig. 2). But it still falls short of the -te.
Next, we generalize the above tree construction to achieve -synchronous tamper-evidence for
any constant . As for the tree construction, the cost is only O(lg t).
3.3 Separating Sets and -TE Schemes
C-schemes. Let C be a collection of contiguous sets (intervals) of integers (time period numbers).
Dene a C-scheme as follows: Let a dierent public/secret key pair (S
I
:PK ;S
I
:SK ) correspond
to each interval I 2 C (the key pair is generated randomly at the beginning of the interval, and
is destroyed at the end of it). Each C-signature for the time period t contains a S
I
-signature
hS
I
:PK ; 
I
i generated using S
I
:SK for each interval I 2 C such that t 2 I.
9
Let C contain the
innite interval I
0
of all the integers; S
I
0
:PK is the public key of the C-scheme.
Say, that C is an -separating collection if for any t
e
< t
1
; t
2
: jt
e
  min(t
1
; t
2
)j > jt
1
  t
2
j,
there exists an interval I 2 C such that t
1
; t
2
2 I but t
e
62 I.
Lemma 1. Let C be an -separating collection. Then C-scheme is -synchronous tamper-evident.
Indeed, since C is -separating, there exists I, such that t
1
; t
2
2 I but t
e
62 I. Thus, both
signatures
b

t
1
;M
1
and
b

t
2
;M
2
must use the same public key S
I
:PK . However, S
I
:SK was not created
{ and thus was not known { at the time of the latest exposure t
e
. Thus F cannot generate the
S
I
-signature for S
I
:PK (i.e., we could reduce forging S signatures to F ' success). ut
The 0-, - and 1- te schemes of the above sections can be viewed as such C-schemes: For the
0-te scheme we used C
0
= fft; t + 1; : : :g for all tg. Our 1-te scheme used C
1
= fftg for all tg.
The tree-based schemes use C
tree
= ffi2
j
; : : : ; (i+1)2
j
  1g for all j0; i>0g.
10
Thus, constructing -te schemes is reduced to a combinatorial problem of constructing -separating
collections; the number of intervals containing t, for each t, corresponds to the scheme's cost.
Constructing -Separating Collections
Fact 1 For any t
1
; t
2
: jt
1
  t
2
j = d, any interval of size  d(1 + ) containing t
1
; t
2
cannot also
contain such t
e
that jt
e
 min(t
1
; t
2
)j > jt
1
  t
2
j.
Indeed, jt
e
 min(t
1
; t
2
)j > jt
1
  t
2
j = d) jt
e
 max(t
1
; t
2
)j > (1 + )d.
Let  be any constant such that 0 <  < . Intuitively, we dene intervals as in Fig. 3: the
intervals of length d(1+) are going to be shifted by multiples of d( ). Then, for any t
1
; t
2
such that d  jt
1
 t
2
j  d(1+) there exists an interval (i) containing both t
1
and t
2
and (ii) not
containing t
e
satisfying the -synchronicity: jt
e
 min(t
1
; t
2
)j > jt
1
  t
2
j.
For t
1
; t
2
such that jt
1
 t
2
j > d(1+) intervals of size > d(1+)(1+) are needed. In other
words the interval lengths can increase by a factor of 1 + .
9
Thus, the signer must have the same secret key S
I
:SK for all t 2 I. But then if the signer has S
I
:SK during
periods t
1
< t
2
, then this key must also be in the signer's possession during all periods t : t
1
 t  t
2
. Therefore,
requiring that the sets in C be contiguous reects the security requirements in a natural way.
10
The version of Sec. 3.2 actually allowed i = 0; though using it with a balanced hierarchy also bounds t. If t is
unbounded, then allowing i = 0 leads to each t belonging to innite number of intervals and thus to an innite
number of keys for each time t. The C
tree
above eliminates all intervals containing 0: these cannot help separation
of any t
1
; t
2
from t
e
. This results in each t belonging to only 1 + lg t intervals.
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(1+α)d
t1 t2
>d
<d(1+β)
dd (1+β) (α−β)
te
Fig. 3. Arranging intervals of size d(1+). Any two points at distance  d(1+) will be contained in one of the
intervals. At the same time, for any t
1
; t
2
, separated by distance > d, the interval containing t
1
; t
2
cannot contain
such a t
e
which would satisfy -synchronicity requirement: jt
e
  min(t
1
; t
2
)j > jt
1
  t
2
j. Thus, these intervals \take
care" of the signatures separated by distances >d and  d(1+)
More formally, for level j, let d
j
def
= (1+)
j
. Then the corresponding interval length is L
j
def
=
d
j
(1+), separating t
1
; t
2
: d
j
 jt
1
 t
2
j  d
j
(1+) from t
e
. The shift 
j
def
= d
j
( ). The intervals
for level are shifted by 
j
, guaranteeing that each pair t
1
; t
2
as above belongs to some interval of
the level. Dene interval I
;;i;j
= [i
j
; : : : ; i
j
+L
j
  1]. Note: jI
;;i;j
j = L
j
. We refer to j as the
level of I
;;i;j
, and i as its displacement.
Dene C
;
= fftg : t > 0g
S
fI
;;i;j
: i>0; j  0g. Intuitively, the singleton sets deal with
the cases jt
1
 t
2
j = 0 (i.e., t
1
= t
2
), while the level j intervals handle the distances jt
1
 t
2
j such that
d
j
< jt
1
 t
2
j  d
j+1
.
In C
;
, no more than L
j
=
j
+1 = (1+)=( )+1 intervals of any one level contain each point
t. Moreover, t cannot be contained by any intervals of level j such that t < 
j
= (1+)
j
( ).
Thus, t can be contained by intervals of at most log
1+
(t=(  )) levels.
So, the total number of intervals containing time period t is upper-bounded by 1+((1+)=( 
) + 1)  log
1+
t=(  ). Using an C
;
-scheme to achieve -synchronous tamper-evidence yields
the same upper-bound (plus one for the I
0
) on the number of keys used for and ordinary signatures
included in an -te signature at time t. For constants  >  > 0, the above formula simplies to
O(lg t). We leave out of this version of the paper the question of computing the values of  for
the given , which would yield the best constant factors hidden by the big-O notation. It may be
helpful to consider the case of 2-synchronicity: using  = 1, the number of keys stored and used at
time t is at most 2 + 4 lg t. Thus we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2. For any constant >0 and ordinary signature scheme , there exists an -synchronous
tamper-evident scheme KESig, storing O(lg t) keys and generating O(lg t) -signatures for each
KESig-signature at time t.
3.4 Lower Bounds For The Subset Separation Schemes
In this section we consider only tamper-evident schemes based on using an ordinary signature
scheme to separate S from F by requiring that for any t
e
< t
1
; t
2
there exists a signature scheme
instance with a public key p (using corresponding secret key s) such that the signatures for times
t
1
; t
2
must both use this instance, but at time t
e
the key s was not known to the signer (and thus to
the attacker, who exposed all the secrets of the signer at times  t
e
). Such schemes are equivalent to
the subset separation schemes. We provide the lower-bounds for this restricted class. The general
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case lower bounds proven in the subsequent section subsume those of this section. However, we
leave them here due to their more intuitive clarity.
Claim. Any ste scheme requires at least t 2 ordinary keys/signatures to be used for each ste
signature at time t.
11
Indeed, consider the signature at time t
2
= t. Let t
1
= t   1, and t
e
= t   2. Then there must
be a key shared by t
1
, and t
2
, but not t
e
. Now, let t
1
= t   2; t
e
= t   3. Then, there must be a
dierent key shared by t; t   2, but not t   3. Let's make one more step before we generalize: let
t
1
= t  3; t
e
= t  4. Then, t and t  3 must share a key not shared by t
e
. This key must clearly be
dierent from the previous. But it also must be dierent from the one shared by t and t 1 but not
t  2: because if the key is known at times t  3 and t, then it must be known also at t  2. Thus,
to generalize: for each 1 < i < t  1, there must be a dierent key shared by t
1
= t and t
2
= t  i
but not t
e
= t  i  1. ut
The above claim proves that our scheme (Sec. 3.1) is optimal within this general approach.
That claim generalizes to -synchronicity:
Claim. For any constant , any -synchronous scheme for each signature at time t must generate

(lg t) ordinary signatures (using as many dierent keys).
Indeed, let  > 0 be some arbitrarily small constant, set t
2
= t, and initially let t
1
= t 1 and t
e
=
bt  (1 + )  c. There must be a key that separates t
1
; t
2
from t
e
. And it must be dierent from
the one that separates t
2
= t and t
1
= bt  (1 + )  c from t
e
= bt  (1 + )  (1 + )
2
  2c.
This step can be iterated k times as long as t 
P
k
i=0
(1+)
i
= (1+)
k+1
=. Thus, at least 
(lg t)
ordinary signatures (all using dierent keys) must be generated for each TE signature at time t. ut
The next section extends these lower bounds to the most general tamper-evident schemes.
4 General Lower Bounds
Let KESig be some key-evolving signature scheme with a divergence test, according to the denitions
in Sec. 2.1, and the adversary as in the Denition 1.
Dene support of t, supp
KESig
(t), to be a longest increasing chain t
0
; t
1
; : : : ; t
l
= t, such that
t; t
i+1
are t
i
-safe in the given KESig scheme for all i : 0  i  l   1 (thus, t
j
; t
j
0
are also t
i
-safe for
any j; j
0
> i). Order of t, ord
KESig
(t), is dened to be the length l of this chain (measured in the
number of possible values for the exposure time period t
i
). For example, if KESig is ste, then for
any t, ord
KESig
(t) = t+ 1, since we can set t
i
= i  1 for all 0  i  t+ 1; exposure time t
e
=  1
corresponds to having no exposure. For -te KESig, ord
KESig
(t) = (log
1+
t).
Recall that k is the security parameter used in the denition of safety (Def. 2).
We now show that the length of the signature at time t must be at least ord
KESig
(t)  k.
Let t
0
; t
1
; : : : ; t
l
= t be a support of t. Let F
0
be any (forger) algorithm; unless stated otherwise,
we do not assume that F
0
has any access to the legitimate signer's secrets or even signatures. In this
respect, F
0
is signicantly weaker than the adversary F of the Denition 1. Generate an instance
of KESig, and let the legitimate signer S generate signatures ht
i
; 
i
i for some message m and all
i = 1; : : : ; l (signature for t
0
is not needed, since t
0
is used only as a possible exposure time period;
often t
0
= 1). For a signature ht; i of some other messagem
0
(6=m) at time t, dene event C
i
(ht; i)
to be KESig:Div(ht
i
; 
i
i; ht; i) = ok. Let C
[j]
(ht; i) be the conjunction of all C
i=1;:::;j
(ht; i).
11
This claim, including the proof, was suggested by Leonid Levin.
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Lemma 3. Prob[F
0
! (t; ) : s.t. C
[l]
(ht; i) ] < 1=2
kl
Proof: Let P
j
def
= Prob[F
0
! (t; ) : s.t. C
[j]
(ht; i) ], for 0<j l, and (vacuously) set P
0
=1. Then
the lemma states that P
l
< 1=2
kl
.
Let F
0
! (t; ). Then, P
j
= Prob[C
j
(ht; i) jC
[j 1]
(ht; i)]  Prob[C
[j 1]
(ht; i)]. Substitute P
j 1
=
Prob[C
[j 1]
(ht; i)] into the above to get P
j
= Prob[C
j
(ht; i)jC
[j 1]
(ht; i)]  P
j 1
.
Let S(t
i
) be the full record of the legitimate signer's evolution up to and including time period t
i
(that is the record of all the signer's information up until that time, including the secret keys).
Then, Prob[C
j
(ht; i)jC
[j 1]
(ht; i)]  Prob[F
0S(t
j 1
)
! (t; 
0
) : KESig:Div(ht
j
; 
j
i; ht; 
0
i) = ok] 
Prob[F
S
! ht
0
e
= t
j 1
; f(t
0
1
= t
j
; 
0
1
= 
j
); (t
0
2
= t; 
0
2
)gi : KESig:Div(ht
0
1
; 
0
1
i; ht
0
2
; 
0
2
i)= ok] < 1=2
k
,
where F is the forger from Denitions 1, 2.
Putting it all together we get P
j
< P
j 1
 1=2
k
. Thus, P
j
< 1=2
kj
. ut
Let C
l
(ht; i) be true (e.g., ht; i is generated by the legitimate signer S). If jj < lk then a
random 
0
=  with probability > 1=2
lk
, which contradicts Lemma 3. Thus, the following theorem
follows as a corollary from the Lemma:
Theorem 1. Let KESig:Sign! ht; i for some message. Then jj > k  ord
KESig
(t).
Since for the strongly tamper evident schemes ord
KESig
(t) = t + 1, and for the -synchronous
schemes (for nite >0) ord
KESig
(t) = (lg t), we get the following corollaries:
Corollary 1 (Strong Tamper-Evident Signature Length).
jj > k  (t+ 1) for any ste KESig:Sign! ht; i.
Corollary 2 (-Synchronous Tamper-Evident Signature Length).
jj = 
(k  lg t) for any -te KESig:Sign! ht; i.
5 Discussion
Universal evidence. We can modify our constructions (e.g., using chaining as suggested in the
footnote 6) so that any pair of signatures ht
1
; 
1
i; ht
2
; 
2
i, which are both valid for the same public
key but Div(ht
1
; 
1
i; ht
2
; 
2
i) = foul, represents a universal and indisputable evidence that either
the key has been exposed or that the signer is faking the key exposure.
PKI implications. Revocation is a traditional method of dealing with the compromised keys.
Whatever is the revocation mechanism, the key compromise must be detected rst, and then the
revocation process followed appropriately. In all the traditional Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs),
some party | call it Revocation Authority (RA) | must be convinced that the key is indeed
compromised, before it actuates the revocation: typically, generating a revocation note
12
.
Whether RA is the signer himself or a CA (or other), convincing RA of the key compromise
using the previously existing methods is potentially cumbersome both logistically and legally.
In contrast, our schemes allow anyone to detect tampering and present a universally convincing
proof of the compromise: two valid but inconsistent signatures as above. In fact, such a proof may
serve as a revocation note. Moreover, the legitimate signer S can post on some publicly accessible
site his signature for each day (the signature is veried before being posted to avoid denial of
12
This can be a self-signed \suicide note" (as in PGP or other approaches e.g., [Riv98]); in these cases RA is the
signer himself. Alternatively, in the more common PKIs, the revocation note is a part of a Certicate Revocation
List (CRL), or a similar data structure, which is generated and certied by some (trusted?) third party, such as
the Certication Authority (CA).
Cryptographic Tamper Evidence 13
service attack). This can serve as an automatic revocation check: instead of checking a CRL, the
veriers can use that signature with the Div algorithm to verify that S has not been compromised.
Of course, it is possible that immediately following an exposure, F manages to post her version of
the daily signature. But then S will be able to detect the tampering and resolve the conict by
out-of-band means. Alternatively, the server can allow more than one signature to be posted for
each user | if two of the posted signatures trigger the tamper-detection test Div, then the other
users of the system will also know that the corresponding secret key has been compromised. A
potential key-recovery mechanism would then be to allow the server to obtain S's signature over
some secure connection, and remove the previous signatures from the server. Then the veriers will
again be able to distinguish S's signatures from the forger's.
The public posting site can be replaced with a more \personal" version: in the case of regular
transactions between the signer and a recipient, the recipient can keep the latest signer's signature
as a \cookie". Then even after the exposure of the signer's secrets, the adversary cannot impersonate
the singer to the recipient (again, except immediately after the exposure).
Symmetric signatures and peer-to-peer setting. Since our constructions are generic, it is
possible to use symmetric signatures, and apply the tamper-evidence to the peer-to-peer setting.
The use of symmetric signatures only, however, requires the coordinated randomized key evolution
between the pair of connected nodes. This can be achieved under the condition that the adversary
cannot access some of the information exchanged by the legitimate parties. While this assumes a
weaker adversary than the one tolerated with the asymmetric signatures, this model can still be
practical in some situations and has the advantage of eÆciency oered by the symmetric signatures.
Combining tamper evidence with other features. The tamper-evidence can be combined
with other security improvements for signatures: e.g., our constructions can be easily generalized
to the forward-secure [BM99] or intrusion-resilient models [IR02,Itk02].
Monotone Signatures. The monotone signatures were dened by Naccache, Pointcheval and
Tymen in [NPT01]. These signatures allow updating the verication algorithm. Then, the legitimate
signer can reveal some secrets under duress. This would allow the extortionist to generate signatures
valid under the current verication algorithm. However, when the signer is released, he can update
the verication algorithm in such a way that all the signatures generated by the legitimate signer
remain valid under the new verication procedure as well; but the signatures generated by the
extortionist are no longer valid.
In contrast to tamper-evident or forward-secure signatures, the denitions of [NPT01] do not
include the possibility of also updating the signer keys. We propose to use key-evolving monotone
signatures instead. Then we can achieve the main features of the monotone signatures directly from
the tamper-evident signatures: The verication algorithm would include checking for tampering
using Div and a signature for time period t  1. The signer would maintain a \correct" version of
the secret key, as well as a version \diverged" in the current period. This divergence cannot be
detected against the signature of the \pre-diversion" period t  1, used in the current verication.
Thus, the signer can release that diverged version under duress. Afterwards, he can update the
verication by including a signature for the period t. The attacker can be prevented from generating
earlier signatures by combining the above with the forward-security. This method is certainly not
any more eÆcient than the original constructions of [NPT01]; it is given here solely to illustrate the
connection of the two concepts. However, the eÆciency of the monotone signatures can be improved
by the key-evolution: this approach is further developed in [Itk03].
Other Potential Approaches. Suppose, we allow the Div test to occasionally miss divergence
and potentially give a false positive: returning foul on two legitimate signatures. In addition, assume
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that F cannot obtain any signatures from S after t
e
. Then we may attempt the following approach.
Dene some metric on the space of public keys, and restrict the distance between consecutive public
keys S
i
:PK ;S
i+1
:PK , so that there is still a multiple choice for the next public key. Then evolution
of the signer corresponds to a random walk. We can now try to utilize the property that within one
random walk, the distance between the positions at times t
1
; t
2
is likely to be noticeably smaller
than the positions corresponding to t
1
and t
2
on two dierent random walks (which diverged at
some previous time t
e
). It is unlikely, however, that this approach will improve on our results above.
Other possible directions for future research include considering more interactive models of
authentication (e.g., zero-knowledge proofs of identity [FS86,FFS88]), and extending Div to use
more than two signatures to detect tampering (such an extension may impact some of the PKI-
related issues discussed in this section)
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